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Special Education as both History and Theory: Disability and the
Possibility of Interdisciplinary Friendship: AMultilogue Response to
Ellis, Osgood, andWarren
Benjamin Kelsey Kearl
methodological grist for the
history of education
Notes
I am excited by the responses that “Of Laggards and Morons” has generated from Jason Ellis,
Robert Osgood, and Donald Warren. In attempting to reply to their insightful commentaries, I focus
on the possibility of interdisciplinary friendship across education history and philosophy concerning
not only the historical features and functions of special education but also the ways Progressive Era
theories of human difference continue to haunt how education constitutes both itself and its subjects.
Each of these efforts is informed by the scholarship of Bernadette Baker who serves as a model of
this proposed historical-philosophical friendship.
Historicizing and Theorizing Special Education Together
Questions of theory are not new to education history, just as questions of history are not new to
education theory.1 These questions bring history and theory and into conversation as mutually1 See, for example, Eileen H. Tamura, ed., “Theory
in Educational History,” Special issue, History of
Education Quarterly 51, no. 2 (2011). constitutive doings—history theorizes and theory historicizes. Good history is thus more than a
recitation of past occurrences. Similarly, good theory is more than an ideological lens into which the
Benjamin Kelsey Kearl is a Philosophy of Education doctoral candidate in the School of Education at Indiana University.
Benjamin is currently a Visiting Instructor in Educational Studies at Purdue University, Fort Wayne. He can be reached at
bkearl@indiana.edu. The author would like to thank Adrea Lawrence and Sara Clark for their helpful edits and suggestions and
Jason Ellis, Robert Osgood, and Donald Warren for the insightful responses.
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past is pressed into view; it is rather, as Warren suggests, a prism that refracts light into spectrums
that complicate what is being viewed.2 If history and theory work in concert, so too do empirics and2 Donald Warren, “Escaping Befriended Circles:
A Multilogue Response to Benjamin Kelsey
Kearl’s ‘Of Laggards and Morons: Definitional
Fluidity and the Theory of Progressive Era
Special Education,’” Education’s Histories,
December 16, 2016, http://www.educationshisto-
ries.org/escaping-befriended-circles-a-multilogue-
response-to-benjamin-kelsey-kearls-of-laggards-
and-morons-definitional-fluidity-borderlinity-and-
the-theory-of-progressive-era-special-education/.
theory with the important caveat that empirical phenomena do not exist apart from their method of
observation. After all, as John Dewey reminds us: “To know the meaning of empiricism, we need to
understand what experience is.”3 Within education, this empirical caveat gains import due to the
3 John Dewey, Experience & Education (New York:
Touchstone, 1938), 25.
propensity to dismiss as non- or mis-educative whatever observers do not recognize through the most
convenient of education lenses, the school.4 Such “regimes of truth” enable education to make sense
4 For more on this point see Adrea Lawrence,
“The Trickster, Our School,” Education’s Histo-
ries, May 1, 2014, http://www.educationshisto-
ries.org/series/our-trickster-the-school/ and Don-
ald Warren, “Waging War on Education: Ameri-
can Indian Version,” Education’s Histories, July 29,
2015, http://www.educationshistories.org/waging-
war-education-american-indian-versions/.
of what and whom is being viewed with the implication that observing human difference is what
allows education to envision itself.5
5 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in Power:
Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol.
2, ed. James D. Faubion (New York, The New
Press, 2000), 131-33.
The argument I make in “Of Laggards and Morons” has similar ocular implications. That is, I
maintain that to fully witness our educational present education historians and philosophers as well
as policymakers must pass through the spectral refractions that special education casts upon general
education. Baker helps to explain the importance of this movement:
If disciplines require compartmentalization and boundaries and if written History in the
Academy in a variety of geopolitical locales must be predicated on an empirical condition
of proof which requires an ocular portal and consensus around what is seen, how is it
that some objects described as invisible become legitimated as real and continuously
operationalized and not others, and why?66 Bernadette Baker, “The Purpose of History?
Curriculum Studies, Invisible Objects and Twenty-
first Century Societies,” Journal of Curriculum The-
orizing 29, no. 1 (2013): 26.
Of interest to Baker is why the child mind became an object of empirical study for the emerging
discipline of psychology when an equally invisible phenomenon like the ghost did not garner similar
academic support. This discrepancy suggests that history has a purpose, which Baker analyzes
through juxtaposing four ways of thinking historically. The first puts into conversation the presumed
link between history, correction, and subject-shaping with a hyper-presentism that ignores history as
a way of escaping identity conflicts altogether. The second juxtaposition forces a dialogue between
Darwinian evolution and proponents of theological devolution who maintain that human beings
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devolved into matter from pure consciousness. Next Buddhist questioning of whether there is such a
thing as a self is juxtaposed with the location of the self in indigenous paradigms in an external,
animate cosmos. Lastly, technology is seen as either rescuing history or as a historical condition from
which humanity is in need of rescue.7 Baker also notes how juxtapositions of science and religion do7 Ibid., 27-31.
not necessarily produce neat opposites, but rather amalgamating, antagonistic, and fluid regimes of
truth that can be conscripted by either party to warrant their respective historical-empirical claims.88 Bernadette Baker, “Making History, Making Hu-
mans,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of
Education 20, no. 3 (1999): 357-80.
These juxtapositions are useful here in highlighting the ways historical thinking can extend beyond
either/or distinctions in which empirical historicizations are positioned as oppositional and/or
temporally prior to theoretical speculations. For example, writing Native American history from
within a theoretical assumption that there are internally individuated selves presents historians with
problematic understandings as does observing American education from a historical position that
eclipses the extant educative practices of indigenous peoples. Thinking historically, then, is both a
historical and a theoretical process within which it is unclear which has ontological priority or should
be given argumentative preference. As suggested in “Of Laggards and Morons,” the history and
theory of Progressive Era special education occurred together as education practiced defining itself
through empirical classifications of human difference. Reconstructing such doings can help to
elucidate, even if only in a refracted manner, the haunting legacy of classifying human differences.9
9 While the reconstruction imagined in “Of
Laggards and Morons” is specific to
problematizing Progressive Era special education,
Colin Koopman has developed a helpful pragmatic
reading of genealogy that combines Foucault’s use
of history to problematize the present with
Dewey’s use of history to reconstruct the past; see
Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems
of Modernity (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2013), 217-70.
Either/or distinctions inform Ellis’ call for the importance of historicizing as a way of countering the
imposition of any “one true” theory of special education.10
10 Jason Ellis, “The Theory of Special Education
and the Necessity of Historicizing: A Multilogue
Response to Benjamin Kelsey Kearl and Donald
Warren,” Education’s Histories, January 31, 2017,
http://www.educationshistories.org/the-theory-of-
special-education-and-the-necessity-of-
historicizing-a-multilogue-response-to-benjamin-
kelsey-kearl-and-donald-warren/. Osgood also
notes that “Of Laggards and Morons” suggests a
true theory of Progressive Era special education;
see “Beyond Laggards and Morons: The
Complicated World of Special Education,”
Education’s Histories, February 14, 2017,
http://www.educationshistories.org/beyond-
laggards-and-morons-the-complicated-world-of-
special-education/.
Of concern to Ellis is that absent
empirical accounts of its varied features and functions, special education is reducible to theoretical
descriptions of social control. Against the easiness of such descriptions, Ellis argues that “‘special
education’ is still very important in its own right, quite aside from what it can tell us about general
education.”11 In highlighting this importance, Ellis links what it means to historicize special11 Ellis, “The Theory of Special Education and
the Necessity of Historicizing.”
education first to the capacity to draw distinctions around the various features of Progressive Era
special education, and secondly to the capacity to differentiate special education’s varied and
contradictory functions.12
12 Ibid. Specifically, Ellis, citing Robert L.
Osgood, The History of Special Education: A
Struggle for Equality in American Public Schools
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), draws attention to
the historical existence of “sight-saving, speech
correction, and hard-of-hearing or deaf classes” as
well as “forest schools for the sickly, foreign classes
for the newly arrived immigrant, and orthopedic
classes for children with physical disabilities.”
Of the five possible functions of special education, “Of Laggards and
Morons” reflects only one: categorizing, tracking, and controlling disabled, different, difficult, or even
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threatening children. These two ways of historicizing special education provide the backdrop for
Ellis’ more emphatic claim that within education’s histories special education is overly theorized.
Osgood is also invested in the empirical features of Boston common schools and the functions of
their differentiated curricular spaces.1313 Robert L. Osgood, “Undermining the Common
School Ideal: Intermediate Schools and Ungraded
Classes in Boston, 1838-1900,” History of Education
Quarterly 37, no. 4 (1997): 375-98; and Osgood,
“Beyond Laggards and Morons.”
Osgood’s response is attentive to the lack of needed distinctions in “Of Laggards and Morons.”
Specifically, Osgood notes that the lack of any development of the methodological observation that
education has and enacts a biography makes it difficult to distinguish the relevancy of this approach.
Equally problematic for Osgood is the philosophical consideration that education generally defies
definition. This consideration is important given the complex ways education manifests itself
“differently in different countries, regions, states, locations, and public/private support.”14 Closely14 Osgood, “Beyond Laggards and Morons.”
related to this point are the multidimensional complexities of not only Progressive Era education but
also special education’s varied place and role within this complicated educational world as well as
the location of school professionals. Like Ellis’ distinctive functions of special education, Osgood
notes institutional features that might give pause to the claim that special education generally
defines education. These include: segregated settings for normal and abnormal children, separate
training for special and regular classroom teachers, and antagonistic “empire building” practices
through which special educationalists seek “greater power, influence, resources, and territory” by
“cutting into the world of regular education.”1515 Ibid.
Ellis and Osgood’s commentaries necessitate important reconsiderations of “Of Laggards and
Morons.” Taken separately, Ellis seems to be asking more of history to help offset theory, while
Osgood seems to be asking more of theory to help clarify history. Taken together, these two
distinguished historians of special education highlight the limitations of my own historical thinking
about special education. I clearly have more work to do along the mutually constitutive paths of
special education history and theory. Osgood’s own work at tracing the historical shifts in disability
labeling and institutional formation is a helpful philosophical resource.16 “Of Laggards and Morons”16 Robert Osgood, “Language, Labels, and Linger-
ing (Re)considerations: The Evolution and Func-
tion of Terminology in Special Education,” Philo-
sophical Studies in Education 37 (2006): 135-45.
is complementary to such efforts in that it posits error as amongst the reasons why and how labels
and institutions changed over time. Following Warren, we might ask: How do we write an education
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history of errors whose miscalculations nonetheless continue to constitute education and its
subjects?17 Irony, rather than evolution, helps to answer this question. Irony is detectable not only17 Warren, “Escaping Befriended Circles.”
in noting how celebratory and empowering first-person labels come to replace terminology that
degrades and marginalizes but also in observing to whom—which bodies—disability labels are made
available, what labels are associated with which bodies, and how disability labeling continues to
simultaneously make possible and obfuscate segregation. Within such observations, indeterminately
defined labels and spaces work reciprocally to both make educated subjects and to populate
educational worlds.1818 For more on this point see Ian Hacking, His-
torical Ontologies (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2002). In his essay “Making Up People,”
Hacking argues for a “dynamic nominalism” in
which persons come into being at the same time
as this or that category of person is invented/dis-
covered such that “making up people changes the
space of possibilities for personhood,” 106-7.
Ellis’ discussion of Lewis Terman’s intervention into the nature and causes of learning problems is
also helpful in journeying along the path of special education history and theory.19 This discussion
19 Jason Ellis, “‘Inequalities of Children in Orig-
inal Endowment’: How Intelligence Testing Trans-
formed Early Special Education in a North Amer-
ican City School System,” History of Education
Quarterly 53, no. 4 (2013): 409-14; and Ellis, “The
Theory of Special Education and the Necessity of
Historicizing.”
suggests that intelligence testing grew to prominence because it could explain in scientific detail
learning problems whereas administrative progressives like Leonard Ayes could only postulate a
general backwardness. Terman’s intervention leads Ellis to theorize the existence of a “testing
moment,” which students could potentially resist.20 While Ellis’ efforts to complicate special
20 Ellis, “‘Inequalities of Children in Original En-
dowment,’” 414-23.
educations’ functions is helpful, as presented, they appear as distinctions without a difference. For
example, diagnosing and treating children “who should have been able to read, but could not” is not
only about classifying dis/ability according to a borderline of ab/normality but also about
determining which bodies should be performing ability better than other bodies.21 As argued in “Of21 Ibid. Emphasis added. For a different read-
ing of Terman’s intervention into intelligence test-
ing that problematizes his diagnosing of learning
problems see Tyson E. Lewis, “Education and the
Immunization Paradigm,” Studies in Philosophy of
Education 28, no. 6 (2009): 485-98.
Laggards and Morons,” such determinations occur against a historical backdrop of indeterminate
definitions of human difference.
In The Measure of Intelligence, for example, Terman notes that borderline cases are “not marked off
by definite IQ limits,” which means that some borderline cases are able “to manage as adults [and] to
get along fairly well in a simple environment.”22 This is because “the ability to compete with one’s22 Lewis Terman, The Measure of Intelligence
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1916), 87.
fellows in the social and industrial world does not depend upon intelligence alone. Such factors as
moral traits, industry, environment to be encountered, personal appearance, and influential relatives
are also involved.”23 A similar definitional indeterminacy facilitated the development of the learning23 Ibid, 87-8.
disability label. Progressive Era practices of theorizing human difference thus anticipate a subsequent
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desire for a testing moment that “explained reading problems of white middle class children without
raising questions about the cultural integrity of middle class homes.”24 If disability labels are not24 Christine E. Sleeter, “Why is there Learning
Disabilities? A Critical Analysis of the Birth of the
Field in its Context,” in The Formation of School
Subjects: The Struggle for Creating an American In-
stitution, ed. Thomas S. Popkewitz (New York:
The Falmer Press, 1987), 226.
ahistorical, but are constituted by, within, and for theories of human difference, then both history
and theory are equally helpful in asking, for instance, what counts as “learning” for an LD label or
as an “emotion” for an ED label and why and to whom keeping track of these differences matters.2525 This use of “keeping track” is in reference to
Jeannie Oakes’ classic study, Keeping Track: How
Schools Structure Inequality (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1985).
The Haunting Legacy of Classifying Human Differences
Baker’s above juxtapositions not only highlight different ways of thinking historically but also the
importance of theoretical considerations to this thinking. More specifically, “how belief in the
existence and characteristic of mind becomes and continues to be an administrative platform, plane
of composition, and site of dis/qualification in the face of historical insults and injuries that have
divided populations in the United States.”26 In problematizing how the child mind became scientized26 Baker, “The Purpose of History?” 33. Original
emphasis.
by, within, and for education, Baker also suggests how ways of seeing determine who—which
bodies—count as being located within history; that is, which bodies are afforded a childhood.2727 Bernadette Baker, “‘Childhood’ in the Emer-
gence and Spread of U.S. Public Schools,” in Fou-
cault’s Challenge: Discourse, Knowledge, and Power
in Education, eds. Thomas S. Popkewitz and Marie
Brennan (New York: Teachers College Press, 1998):
123-37.
Those “savage” populations encountered through colonialism were thus infants who existed outside
the history of Western civilization. Progressive Era education was tasked with advancing these
populations out of their atavistic ways through adolescence and into adulthood. Colonized bodies
were thus made into subjects of education by first becoming objects of historical inquiry.
Returning to The Measure of Intelligence, Terman was less than sanguine about the task set before
education when it came to “Indians, Mexicans, and negroes”:
Their dullness seems to be racial, or at least inherent in the family stocks from which
they come. The fact that one meets this type with such extraordinary frequency among
Indians, Mexicans, and negroes suggests quite forcibly that the whole question of racial
differences in mental traits will have to be taken up anew and by experimental methods.
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The writer predicts that when this is done there will be discovered enormously significant
racial differences in general intelligence, differences which cannot be wiped out by any
scheme of mental culture.2828 Terman, 91-2. Emphasis added.
While the racist tendency of naturalizing intelligence as hereditary perhaps falls within Ellis’
criticism concerning the easy quotability of eugenic discourses, Terman’s observation that new
experimental methods will be required to understand differences in mental traits and his assertion
that such differences cannot be ameliorated through learning not only posits the existence of learning
deficits but also substantiates deficit thinking as a scientifically valid way of understanding human
differences; a way of historical thinking that continues to haunt education and colonize its subjects.
The recapitulationism of child development specialists like G. Stanley Hall and the philosophical
theories of mind from psychologists like William James also informed the scientific and nationalist
realities of which bodies were empirically and thus also imperially adult. These theories were not
only made to apply to colonized populations, but also to Black children already within America’s
slave economy. Western nations justified their observing and classifying children of color and
colonized populations by virtue of having already empirically defined themselves as being within
history’s temporal borders. While Ellis and Osgood’s argument that “Of Laggards and Morons”
posits a true theory of Progressive Era special education does not go unnoticed, I would suggest that
more central to my argument is how indeterminate labels and categorical spaces are vital forces
whose regimes of truth work to constitute education by offering a picture of reality through which it
can envision both itself and its subjects. To suggest that theories of special education operate as if
they are true and to then account for the effects of these truth operations is not the same as positing
a true theory of special education.
Osgood notes that “Of Laggards and Morons” is on to something; specifically, I help to substantiate
inclusionist claims that “it’s all special education.”29 Such praise notwithstanding, I cannot help but29 Osgood, “Beyond Laggards and Morons.” Orig-
inal emphasis.
wonder if this directionality works the other way—that is, it’s all general education. Understanding
that a complete discussion of inclusion debates is beyond the scope of this reply, “Of Laggards and
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Morons” seeks to historicize how persons with disabilities come to be included within general
education.30 Here disability labeling and the categorical spaces of special education work in concert30 For an analysis of inclusion debates see Thomas
M. Skrtic, Disability & Democracy: Reconstructing
(Special) Education for Postmodernity (New York:
Teachers College Record, 1995).
to reciprocally define and populate general educational worlds through the use of, for example,
juridically configured individual education plans. The use of rights-based tactics of inclusion thus
seems to belie Osgood’s insistence that there are “significant distinctions between the concepts of
disability and special education.”31 Instead, “Of Laggards and Morons” shows how the indeterminate31 Osgood, “Beyond Laggards and Morons.” Orig-
inal emphasis.
uses of disability labels makes inclusion more likely for bodies already proximally located along the
normative borders of general education. Uses of disability labeling also run counter to Ellis’
insistence that special education be considered apart from its general education implications and the
easy quotability of eugenicists like Henry H. Goddard.
Ellis and Osgood’s argument that “Of Laggards and Morons” overemphasizes the social controlling
features of special education at the expense of its ameliorative functions also does not go unnoticed.
While acknowledging this theoretical propensity, I would push back that writing in this direction is
made easy by the quotability of eugenic discourses by suggesting that education has still not
adequately addressed how its classificatory past makes possible a biopolitically racist present.32 Still,32 For an example of this present see Nirmala
Erevelles and Andrea Minear, “Unspeakable Of-
fenses: Untangling Race and Disability in Dis-
courses of Intersectionality,” in The Disability Stud-
ies Reader, ed. Leonard J. Davis (New York: Rout-
ledge, 2013). For a discussion of biopolitcs see Tim-
othy Campbell and Adam Sitze, eds., “Biopolitics:
An Encounter,” in Biopolitcs: A Reader (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2000). Specifically, the au-
thors note that biopolitical racism “doesn’t seek
to exclude certain populations from the institu-
tions of civil and political life; it explains why,
despite so many painstaking attempts at inclu-
sion, certain populations nevertheless seem per-
manently incapable of achieving flourishing lives
within those institutions,” 19. For more on this im-
plication see Warren Montag, “Toward a Concep-
tion of Racism without Race: Foucault and Con-
temporary Biopolitcs, Phi 13 (2002): 111-24.
Ellis and Osgood ask an important question: If special education services are so controlling, then
how is it that these provisions uplift this or that student? While special education can be
benevolent, it is important to recognize that amelioration relies on locating individual students along
a continuum of dis/ability in which students are distanced from each other in proximal relation to
the features and functions of their human differences. Hence the insistence upon “severe” categories
of disability. Rather than taking a normative position on whether special education is benevolent or
malevolent, “Of Laggards and Morons” instead invites discussion of the uses of special education
towards these two ends.
Just as there is not a true theory of special education, its regimes of truth are not universally
applicable across student bodies. “Of Laggards and Morons” thus does not preclude benevolent
understandings of special education; rather, it seeks to incite education history and philosophy as
well as policymakers to be attentive to who—which bodies—are ameliorated by, within, and for
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special education. Baker helps explain the importance of this incitation:
The analyses of exam results that point to which populational groups fail or succeed at
what do not simply tell us of the existence of racism or sexism or classism or ableism.
Exams are already the vectors of such –isms, sites for the recirculation of power, a form
of discipline and punishment that assumes ontologies can be segregated, graded, and
differentially valued before any body-mind even enters the examination room.3333 Bernadette Baker, “The Hunt for Disability:
The New Eugenics and the Normalization of School
Children,” Teachers College Record 104, no. 4
(2002): 694.
At stake for Baker here is questioning whether it is possible to imagine education otherwise.
Alternatives to special education’s classificatory past continue to be haunted by scientifically and
juridically configured inscriptions of dis/ability within which the child mind continually becomes an
object of inquiry that is made to empirically reflect an already measured reality. Such reflections, in
turn, become conditions of truth about who children are even before their minds can be examined.
The child mind was made to visibly reflect such a reality by being positioned against the equally
invisible ghost. This juxtaposition substantiated the empirical and material nature of the child mind
while also producing the measurable effects of this nature. The disavowal of the ghost as immaterial
and thus beyond the empiric temporality of this reality is perhaps not that dissimilar to Darwin’s
biologically historicized human being. In each moment, human beings are made through and
different by their inscription within history.
Our collective inability to imagine education otherwise is thus telling of how education continues to
be colonized by a reality that envisions both itself and its subjects in terms of having to prove an
ability to do something and to succeed in the direction that such abilities are measured. While
debates over the degree to which certain child minds need help in proving themselves as such or
whether such proof is even necessary remain important, the difficulty in imagining education without
these debates will persist until education can imagine itself differently. Disability is an affirmative,
embodied position from which such imaginings are possible as well as a critical positionality from
which education history and philosophy can foster friendship.
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Education’s Histories would like to thank Benjamin Kelsey Kearl for his multilogue response and continued
discussion of education’s histories and theory.
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